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Abstract: There are multiple damage functions in the literature to estimate the probability that
a single weapon detonation destroys a point target. This paper addresses differences in the tails
of four of the more popular damage functions. These four cover the asymptotic tail behaviors of
all monotonically decreasing damage functions with well-behaved hazard functions. The differ-
ences in estimates of probability of kill are quite dramatic for large aim-point offsets. This is
particularly important when balancing the number of threats that can be engaged with the
chances of fratricide and collateral damage. In general, analysts substituting one damage function
for another may badly estimate kill probabilities in offset-aiming, which could result in poor
doctrine. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 50: 306–321, 2003.
Keywords: safe-distance; damage function; fratricide; collateral damage; firing theory; offset-
aiming
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper investigates some of the mathematical assumptions made in determining the
vulnerability of targets to weapons. Here, targets refer to things we want to destroy, such as
enemy tanks, as well as to things we do not want to damage, such as friendly forces, neutral sites
(like embassies), and civilians. In today’s environment, minimizing casualties to friendly,
neutral, and civilian entities can be vital to policy-makers. One inappropriate shot can greatly
complicate and even alter a nation’s strategy. Some recent examples include: (1) Israel
abandoning an attack into Lebanon prior to meeting its objectives, after two artillery shells, in
a “very grave error,” had “gone long,” killing over 100 civilians (Time Magazine [15]). (2) The
diplomatic fallout associated with the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade
(The New York Times [11]). (3) The suspension of maneuvers at the U.S. Navy’s live-fire range
in Vieques, Puerto Rico, and a request from a Puerto Rican special commission that the Navy
leave, after a bomb missed its intended target and killed a civilian (The New York Times [12]).
(4) The U.S. Government’s concern about the high rate of fratricide as a percentage of casualties
in Desert Storm (General Accounting Office [7]). The cause of some of these incidents was an
error in identification, rather than a ballistic or aiming error. That is, the wrong target was
deliberately hit. Nonetheless, all of these incidents are examples of how, in today’s geopolitical
environment, a single firing or bombing error can have severe ramifications.
© 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
The challenge is to develop doctrine and select targets that maximize the threats destroyed
while simultaneously maintaining tolerable risks of fratricide and collateral damage. Of course,
potential adversaries know this, and some use civilians and politically sensitive objects as cover.
For example, former President Bill Clinton [2] said Osama Bin Laden frustrated efforts to target
him by staying close to large numbers of women and children. Consequently, it is important to
accurately estimate the probability of damaging friendly or neutral entities within close prox-
imity of legitimate targets. If we are overly cautious in our estimates of the probabilities of
fratricide or collateral damage, then we will not engage all of the targets we desire and could
with a high assurance of safety—i.e., we will set safe-distances that are too large. Safe-distances
are the distances that friendly forces are kept from potential targets, such as when ground forces
in close combat receive close air support and/or supporting artillery fire (see David [4]). In order
to reduce the number of fratricides, when friendly units are closer than the safe-distance of a
potential target, that target is not engaged. If we err on the low side in our estimates of the
probabilities of fratricide or collateral damage, we may incur many more such incidents. Note
that this tradeoff is likewise important in setting training limits, where we want to train as
realistically as possible while eliminating training casualties.
Many factors affect the probability that a weapon detonation will disable a target (see Ball
[1]). The relatively few real-world tests that are available, as well as complex computer models,
are used to estimate kill-probability contours. These complex patterns can be difficult to work
with. Consequently, analysts often use simple damage functions to estimate the probability that
a target will be killed. These simple damage functions, some of which are discussed below, are
sometimes used to develop doctrine and to adjudicate attrition events in simulations (see [16]
and [17]). Therefore, it is important to understand the attributes of these functions.
There is no one theoretically accepted mathematical form for damage functions, which differ
according to the warhead, target, and kill criteria. This paper compares numerically and
analytically the estimates of the probability that point targets not at the aim-point are killed, for
four diverse and popular damage functions. The differences in estimates are shown to be
systematically quite dramatic for large aim-point offsets, as reported in recent empirically based
research (see [4] and [5]). This is particularly important when balancing the number of threats
that can be engaged with the chances of fratricide and collateral damage.
The next section gives the necessary overview of the target coverage problem. Section 3
discusses four damage functions. Section 4 shows, numerically, how the shape of a damage
function affects the probability of kill as the distance between the target and the aim-point
varies. Section 5 formulates some of what can be gleaned from the numerical examples into
limiting theorems. The final section extends the results to analysis areas and damage functions
not explicitly covered in this paper.
2. BACKGROUND
We will consider situations in which the size of the target is small relative to the lethal range
of the weapon. In such cases, the target is often represented as a point target. This paper
estimates the probability that a target (with an emphasis on the target being a friendly or
neutral/civilian entity) is destroyed (i.e., a binary outcome) when the aim-point is some distance
R from the target. That is, we are firing at a hostile entity, with the aim-point a distance R from
something (which we will refer to as a target) that we do not want to damage. This is often
referred to as offset-aiming (i.e., the aim-point is offset from the target). Figure 1 illustrates this
situation. Without loss of generality, we assume that the target (friendly unit) is at the origin and
that the aim-point is along the x-axis. Due to systematic and random errors, the distance from
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the random impact point to the target is r. Note: All of the mathematics remains the same for
offset-aiming at a hostile target. In practice, due to doctrine or errors in estimates of the target’s
location, enemy targets frequently are not at the aim-point.
The probability (P) of killing the target (friendly unit) is a function of the range r from the
weapon’s impact point to the target. This assumes that the probability of kill depends only on
range, i.e., is independent of direction. For situations in which this does not apply, a conservative
bound can be obtained by choosing the maximum (over direction) probability of kill for a given
range r. Operationally, we want a safe-distance R that is as small as possible, thus allowing us
to engage the maximum number of enemy targets while keeping the probabilities of fratricide
and collateral damage acceptably low. The specifics of this trade-off depend on the costs and
benefits associated with each individual operation; therefore, these trade-offs must be made on
a case-by-case basis.
There has been a good deal of analysis on kill probabilities of point targets (see Eckler and
Burr [6], Przemieniecki [13], Washburn [20], and Youngren [22]). In this paper, the “target”
may be something we are aiming at or something we want to avoid hitting. The calculation of





px, y  dx, y dydx, (1)
where
P  the probability that the point target (friendly unit at the origin) is destroyed,
p( x, y)  the probability density function of the weapon’s impact point,
d( x, y)  the probability that the point target is destroyed given that the weapon
impacts at point ( x, y).
This is called a damage function (see examples below) and will also be denoted by d(r), where
r  x2  y2 is the distance from the impact point to the target at the origin.
Figure 1. An example of offset-aiming. The distance of a friendly unit, at the origin, from the aim-point
is R. Random firing errors result in the weapon landing at a random impact point, in this case at a distance
r from the friendly unit. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.
interscience.wiley.com.]
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The probability density function of the weapon’s impact point, p( x, y), represents the
uncertainty as to where the weapon will detonate, given the aim-point. For the calculations in







xa  the x coordinate of the aim-point,
ya  the y coordinate of the aim-point,
  the standard deviation in any direction from ( xa, ya).
3. FOUR DAMAGE FUNCTIONS
Numerous damage functions have been proposed in the literature. Following Eckler and Burr
[6]: “In general, a damage function is circularly symmetric and non increasing from one to zero
along any radius outward [from the impact point].” These authors define about a dozen damage
functions. We will concentrate on four discussed by Przemieniecki [13]. They are:
(1) The cookie-cutter damage function d1r   1 if r  LR0 if r  LR  ,
where LR is called the lethal range.
(2) The Gaussian or normal damage function, d2r  e
r2/2b2.
(3) The exponential damage function, d3r  e
r/b.
(4) The lognormal damage function, d4r  .5  1  erflnr/2	 ,
where erf( x)   2 0x et2 dt.
The distance of the target from the impact point, r, must be nonnegative. All of the parameters
are positive, and the lognormal damage function has two,  and 	. The lognormal has been used
to model “damage from nuclear weapons” (e.g., Kerlin et al. [9]). The cookie-cutter is the
“simplest” damage function (Przemieniecki [13]) and is often used in practice. The Gaussian
damage function is also in common use, due, in part, to its nice mathematical properties (see
Sandmeyer [14] and Washburn [20]).
We will assume that the damage function is continuous and differentiable, at all but a finite
number of points, for r  0, and define some functionals that allow us to normalize and
compare different damage function shapes. Lethal range and lethal area are measures of the
vulnerability of the target to the weapon. The lethal range (LR) of d(r) is 0
	 d(r) dr. While
not always mathematically correct, the lethal range is often used to describe the lethality of a
weapon against a target as “an average miss-distance . . . at which the round can kill a particular
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kind of target” (see [22]). Of course, for damage functions other than the cookie-cutter, targets
with miss-distances greater than the lethal range may be killed, and targets where the impact
point is within the lethal range have a chance of surviving. The lethal area ( A) of a weapon,
given the target type, is defined as A  x y d(x





dr is a measure of how fast the damage function’s tail is dropping, normalized by
the height of the damage function, as a function of r (see Washburn [20] and Cox and
Oakes [3]).
The four damage functions, with their parameters scaled to have a lethal range of one, are
graphed together in Figure 2. For d1, d2, and d3, there is only one parameter, so the scaling is
unique. For d4, the lognormal damage function, there are two parameters, and no unique scaling.
For this paper, the lethal range of one was achieved by setting 	  1; the limiting behavior (as
defined by the theorems later in this paper) is unaffected by the particular choice of  and 	.
There are noticeable differences in the functions for different miss-distances. Since we are
interested in the damage functions’ tails, the relative behaviors of the (non-cookie-cutter)
damage functions’ tails are shown in Figure 3. Of course, the cookie-cutter damage function is
zero for all values greater than the lethal range. These damage functions exhibit different
behavior for all miss-distances. The differences, however, are proportionally much greater in the
extreme tails. The Gaussian damage function drops proportionally at an increasingly faster rate;
the exponential damage function drops proportionally at a constant rate; and the lognormal
damage function’s proportional rate of drop tapers off to zero.
While there are other damage functions in the literature, these four contain the four types of
limiting damage function behavior, as the miss-distance r goes to infinity, for all monotonically
decreasing damage functions with well-behaved hazard functions. Here, well-behaved means
that there exists an R such that, for all r  R, d(r)  0 or the hazard function is continuous
and monotonic. The author is unaware of any damage function in the literature that does not
meet these very mild conditions. These four limiting tail behaviors, as quantified by the hazard
function, are:
Figure 2. Four common damage functions, for r from 0 to 3, with a lethal range of 1. [Color figure can
be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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(1) The probability of kill is zero above a certain miss-distance. The cookie-cutter damage
function has this behavior.
(2) For all r  0, d(r)  0, and, as r 3 	, H(r) 3 	. The Gaussian damage function has
this behavior.
(3) For all r  0, d(r)  0, and, as r 3 	, H(r) 3 c, where c is a positive constant. The
exponential damage function has this behavior.
(4) For all r  0, d(r)  0, and, as r 3 	, H(r) 3 0. This implies that, for all y, as x
3 	, d(x  y)/d(x) 3 1. That is, the extreme tail is very flat. The lognormal damage
function has this behavior.
While there are several damage functions that an analyst can use, the best one is, of course,
the one that best fits the empirical data. Unfortunately, for many weapon and target pairs, there
is a paucity of (non-computer-generated) data with which one can reliably estimate the shape of
the damage function, particularly in the extreme tail. The number of warhead/target/hit-criterion
combinations, coupled with the number and expense of tests required to accurately estimate the
underlying damage functions, suggests that this will be a continuing problem. There is also little
guidance, to the author’s knowledge, about when the various forms are appropriate. David [5]
states: “Very little, if any, is said in the open literature on the actual assignment of these
mathematical forms to empirical data, which pertain to real weapons.” In fitting damage
functions to classified empirical data on fragmenting weapons, he finds that the frequently used
cookie-cutter and Gaussian damage functions significantly understate the probabilities of kill in
the tails. Przemieniecki [13] writes: “Probably the most accurate representation of the damage
function is the lognormal.” In any event, it is important to understand the consequences that
follow from the form (or presumed form) of the damage function. The next section addresses
this.
Figure 3. The normalized tails of the three non-cookie-cutter damage functions are displayed for miss
distances of 9–10. The functions are normalized by dividing each of them by their value when r  9. This
reveals the relative rates at which the tails are dropping. [Color figure can be viewed in the online issue,
which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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4. NUMERICAL CALCULATIONS FOR THREE DIFFERENT SITUATIONS
We have shown that the tail behaviors of the common damage functions are qualitatively
different. This raises the question: Does this have any practical relevance? The answer is yes,
particularly when estimating the probabilities of fratricide or collateral damage of entities within
close proximity of hostile targets. We will first illustrate this with numerical examples, and then,
in the next section, supply some limiting theorems. We will consider three different cases, with
the lethal ranges of the damage functions smaller than, equal to, and larger than the standard
deviation () of the weapon’s accuracy distribution. For any specific weapon and target pairing,
this depends on the susceptibility of the target, the strength and type of weapon, and the
weapon’s accuracy. In all of these cases, we use a circular normal distribution, centered at the
aim-point, with   1, as the weapon’s impact distribution. For all calculations, the double
integration in Eq. (1) is done numerically, with high precision, using Mathematica [21]. Where
a closed-form solution exists, i.e., for the cookie-cutter with zero offset and the Gaussian
damage function (see [20]) the numerical results have been validated.
Figure 4 displays how the probability of kill varies as a function of the distance (in standard
deviations) of the target (friendly unit) from the aim-point when the lethal range equals the
standard deviation of the weapon’s accuracy distribution. The probabilities of kill are displayed
after a Log10 transformation is applied. This enhances our ability to identify differences between
small probabilities of kill—as occurs in the tails. On the vertical axis of the graph, 0 corresponds
to a probability of kill of 1, 1 corresponds to a probability of kill of .1, 2 corresponds to a
probability of kill of .01, etc. It is worth emphasizing that, while .001 and .00001 may be close
in absolute terms, this difference can be of great practical importance when setting acceptable
risks for potentially catastrophic outcomes—such as fratricide and collateral damage. The
potential effects are compounded during the course of a military campaign, where there may be
many thousands of such calculations made and friendly units put at risk.
Figure 4. The curves of Log10[P(Kill	R)] versus aim-point offset using the cookie-cutter, Gaussian,
exponential, and lognormal damage functions, all scaled to have a lethal range of 1. The lethal ranges are
equal to the standard deviation of the aim-point miss-distance. [Color figure can be viewed in the online
issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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Some observations readily gleaned from Figure 4 are:
● If the target is at the aim-point, then all of the damage functions yield a similar
outcome, with probabilities of kill ranging from .39 (for the cookie-cutter) to .31
(for the lognormal).
● The differences in the extreme tails can be many orders of magnitude. For a target
that is five standard deviations from the aim-point, the probabilities of kill are .019,
.0099, .00019, and .000012, respectively, for the lognormal, exponential, Gaussian,
and cookie-cutter damage functions. Consequently, for a target five standard devi-
ations from the aim-point, a lognormal damage function is 1583 times more likely
than a cookie-cutter with the same lethal range to kill the target. The proportional
difference grows dramatically for larger miss-distances.
● The safe-distances required to meet a specified low probability of kill vary consid-
erably with the type of damage function. For a probability of kill of 1 in 1000, the
required safe-distances are 13.5, 7.3, 4.4, and 3.9 standard deviations, respectively,
for the lognormal, exponential, Gaussian, and cookie-cutter damage functions. Of
course, the potential safe-area for hostile threats goes up by the square of the
safe-distance.
● When setting safe-distances requiring small probabilities of kill, a conservative
choice is to assume a lognormal damage function.
Figure 5 displays the probability of kill as a function of the distance, in standard deviations,
of the target from the aim-point when the damage functions’ lethal ranges are large with respect
to the standard deviation of the weapon’s accuracy distribution. This can occur if the weapon is
highly lethal relative to the target or if the weapon is very accurate. In this situation, the target
Figure 5. The curves of Log10[P(Kill	R)] versus aim-point offset using the cookie-cutter, Gaussian,
exponential, and lognormal damage functions, all with a lethal range of 10. The lethal ranges of the damage
functions are large relative to the standard deviation of aim-point miss-distance (  1). [Color figure can
be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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is extremely vulnerable to the weapon. When the target is five standard deviations from the
aim-point, the probability of kill is over .80 for all of the damage functions. For very accurate
weapons, five standard deviations may not be a great distance in absolute terms. In the extreme
ranges (aim-points of 20 standard deviations from the target), we are just starting to see the
effects that were discussed with respect to Figure 4. That is, the probability of kill for the
Gaussian damage function is dropping faster than the exponential and lognormal damage
functions. The longer tail of the lognormal has yet to dominate the tail of the exponential. Also,
for short miss-distances, the cookie-cutter has the highest probability of kill, while, for long miss
distances, it has the lowest.
When the lethal radius of the damage function is large with respect to the standard deviation
of the weapon’s accuracy distribution, the cookie-cutter damage function is qualitatively
different than the other damage functions. For aim-points that are less than the lethal range of
10 standard deviations, a cookie-cutter damage function results in almost certain destruction.
For aim-points greater than 10 standard deviations from the target, the probability of kill drops
off quickly to near zero.
Figure 6 shows the probability of kill as a function of the distance, in standard deviations, of
the target from the aim-point when the damage functions’ lethal ranges are small with respect
to the standard deviation of the weapon’s accuracy distribution. This can occur if the target is
hardened, the weapon has poor lethality with respect to the target, or the weapon is very
inaccurate. In this situation, the weapon has a difficult time destroying the target. Even when the
target is at the aim-point, the probability of kill is only about .01, for all of the damage functions.
The only damage function that is significantly different than the others is the lognormal. For all
aim-point offsets the lognormal has a higher probability of kill. The difference increases
dramatically for aim-point distances greater than four standard deviations.
Figure 6. The curves of Log10[P(Kill	R)] versus aim-point offset using the cookie-cutter, Gaussian,
exponential, and lognormal damage functions, all with a lethal range of .1. The lethal ranges of the damage
functions are small relative to the standard deviation of aim-point miss-distance (  1). [Color figure can
be viewed in the online issue, which is available at www.interscience.wiley.com.]
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Some general results are gleaned by looking across the three different cases:
● Generally, the cookie-cutter damage function has the highest probability of kill
when the aim-point is centered at the target and the lowest for large offsets. If the
cookie-cutter does not model the real damage function well, i.e., one of the other
forms is a better fit, then it will likely overstate the probability of destroying a
hostile target and underestimate the probability of killing a friendly target (i.e.,
fratricide or collateral damage).
● At the other extreme is the lognormal damage function. That is, if one of the other
damage functions is more appropriate, then the use of the lognormal will result in
dramatically overestimating the safe-distance required to keep fratricides and col-
lateral damage at acceptably low levels. This will increase the safe-areas in which
potential adversaries can operate.
● It is popular among analysts to use cookie-cutter and Gaussian damage functions,
scaled to have the appropriate lethal area, in calculating target kill probabilities.
This is inappropriate for doing safe-distance analysis when the empirical damage
functions have longer tails, as found by David [5]. David speculates that one-
parameter damage functions (such as the cookie-cutter, Gaussian, and exponential)
do not have enough flexibility to accurately model offset-aiming problems. He
suggests a new four-parameter damage function that he has fit to empirical data.
5. SOME LIMITING MATHEMATICAL RELATIONSHIPS
Most of the important conclusions are readily gleaned from the figures in the preceding
section. This section formalizes some of the conclusions about the damage functions’ behavior
in the extreme tails. Proofs of the lemma and the two theorems are in the Appendix. Recall that
the notations for the four damage functions are: d1(r) for the cookie-cutter; d2(r) for the
Gaussian; d3(r) for the exponential; and d4(r) for the lognormal.
LEMMA: For all non-degenerate parameterizations, as r 3 	, d2(r)/d1(r), d3(r)/d2(r), and
d4(r)/d3(r) 3 	.
We define the damage odds ratio (DOR) of two damage functions, di and dj, as










px, y  djx, y dydx
, (3)
where R  xa
2  ya
2 is the distance between the aim-point and the target [see Eq. (2)]. Note
that DOR(i, j, R)  Pi/Pj, where Pi and Pj are the probabilities that the target will be
destroyed, given damage functions di and dj, respectively. Thus, the damage odds ratio tells us
about the relative risks of damage for two damage functions, given the aim-point offset. Using
this, we state the following theorem.
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THEOREM 1: If the weapon’s impact point is distributed as a non-degenerate bivariate
normal distribution, centered at the aim-point, then, as R 3 	, DOR(2, 1, R), DOR(3, 2, R),
and DOR(4, 3, R) 3 	.
The theorem is a consequence of the lemma, which tells us about the tails of the damage
functions, and the fact that the extreme tails of the normal impact probability distribution,
around the aim-point, fall extremely fast. That is, for large enough miss-distances, almost all of
the weapon shots are going to land in the extreme tails of the damage functions, where the ratios
of damage functions can be made (by increasing the aim-point offset R) arbitrarily large. The
theorem simply states what we witnessed in the figures of the preceding section.
Theorem 1, and the proof in the Appendix, do not cover all six pairs of damage functions.
However, it follows directly, by dominance, that as R 3 	, DOR(3, 1, R), DOR(4, 1, R),
and DOR(4, 2, R) 3 	. Another limiting theorem concerning damage odds ratios follows.
THEOREM 2: If the weapon’s impact point is distributed around the aim-point as a bivariate
normal distribution with standard deviations 1 and 2, then, for all finite R, and for all pairs
of damage functions with finite lethal area, as 1 and 2 3 	, P 3 0 for both functions, and
DOR(i, j, R) 3 Ai/Aj, where Ai is the lethal area associated with damage function i.
This follows from the fact that as 1 and 2 go to infinity, a bivariate normal distribution is
approximately uniform in any fixed region around the target. In Figure 6, particularly for small
values of R, the principle of Theorem 2 is starting to take effect. In this figure, the standard
deviation of the impact distribution is 10 times the lethal radiuses of the damage functions.
While the four damage functions all have a lethal range of 1, their lethal areas are: cookie-
cutter  3.1416; Gaussian  4.0; exponential  6.2832; and lognormal  8.5377. For R  0,
the associated (numerically calculated) kill probabilities are: cookie-cutter  .0050; Gaussian 
.0063; exponential  .0097; and lognormal  .0117. The ratio of any two damage functions’
lethal areas is “close” to the ratios of the corresponding kill probabilities, and, even with no
offset, the kill probabilities are relatively small.
6. EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS
In this section, we extend what was done above to (1) other domains in which the form of the
damage function can significantly affect an analysis, and (2) damage functions that are not
explicitly covered here.
(1) The form of the damage function is critical when studying the value of information
against time-critical mobile targets with combat simulations, such as JANUS. In this
situation, a sensor locates a target, with error, and, by the time the target is engaged, by
indirect fire, it may have moved some distance. Thus, the aim-point may be several
standard deviations from the target’s location. In such cases, as we have seen, the form
of the damage function is critical. The JANUS model contains the Carleton (equivalent
to the Gaussian, see Washburn [20]) and cookie-cutter damage functions for indirect fire
(see Titan Tactical Applications [16]). The CASTFOREM model uses the Carleton
damage function to simulate indirect fire (TRADOC Analysis Center—White Sands
Missile Range [17]). When compared to field data, “it was found that the CASTFOREM
model underestimated the damage effects of field data” (TRADOC Analysis Center—
316 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 50 (2003)
White Sands Missile Range [18]). This is consistent with what can occur if the field data
results are similar to what happens with exponential or lognormal damage functions.
(2) Visions of future combat often emphasize a highly nonlinear battlefield (e.g., Joint Chiefs
of Staff [8]). That is, there are not clear lines separating the combatants. This can increase
the risk of fratricide for friendly units. The form of the damage function in combat models
will affect our model’s estimates of the number of fratricides in scenarios involving a
nonlinear battlefield. This may include studies on developing tactics, evaluating systems,
or in the planning of courses of action.
(3) There are many other damage functions in the literature. Fortunately, all of their extreme
tails are similar to one of the four we investigated here. That is: (1) d(r)  0 for large
r, (2) as r 3 	, H(r) 3 0, (3) as r 3 	, H(r) 3 	, and (4) as r 3 	, H(r) 3 a
positive constant. One of the latter three conditions must apply if (1) d(r)  0 for all r 
0, and (2) there exists R such that for r  R the hazard function is continuous and
monotonic. The extreme tails of all of the damage functions in Eckler and Burr [6] and
Przemieniecki [13] fall into one of these four classes.
In general, in the extreme tails:
(a) Damage functions with an R, such that d(r)  0 for r  R, could replace the
cookie-cutter damage function in Theorem 1.
(b) Damage functions d(r), such that, for all   0, there exists positive R and K, such
that, for all r  R, 	d(r)/er

 K	 
 , with   1, could replace the Gaussian
damage function in Theorem 1.
(c) Damage functions d(r), such that, for all   0, there exists positive R and K, such
that, for all r  R, 	d(r)/er  K	 
 , could replace the exponential damage
function in Theorem 1.
(d) Damage functions d(r), such that, for all   0, there exists positive R and K, such
that, for all r  R, 	d(r)/er

 K	 
 , with  
 1, or d(r)  1/(a polynomial),
could replace the lognormal damage function in Theorem 1.
For damage functions that consist of a finite sum of subfunctions, the extreme tail
behavior is most similar to the slowest-dropping subfunction. For damage functions that
consist of a finite product of subfunctions, the extreme tail behavior is characterized by
the fastest-dropping subfunction.
(4) When there are multiple shots, the effects of the form of the damage function on the
chances of fratricide and collateral damage can be exacerbated. That is, the damage odds
ratios due to salvos are usually greater than for single shots. See David [4] for more on
the effects of salvo fire on safe-distances.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF LEMMA AND THEOREMS
Proof of Lemma 1
We will first show that, as r 3 	, d2(r)/d1(r) 3 	. This follows immediately from the fact that, by definition, there
exists finite LR, such that r  LR f d1(r)  0, and, for all r  0, d2(r)  0.
For the exponential and Gaussian damage functions, d3r/d2r  e
r1/b1r/ 2b2
2, where b1 and b2 are, respectively,
the positive parameters in the exponential and Gaussian damage functions. Clearly, as r 3 	, d3(r)/d2(r) 3 	.
For the lognormal and exponential damage functions,




.5  1  erf lnr/2 	
er/b ,












and applying l’Hopital’s rule to this.
Proof of Theorem 1
For ease of exposition, we will assume that the firing errors are circular normal, with   1, around the aim-point.
The more general cases follow from the same ideas, but require much more bookkeeping. Exploiting this symmetry, we
will hold ya  0 and let xa 3 	; of course, now xa  R. Recall that the target (friendly unit) is at the origin and r
2 
x2  y2.
We will show the result in two steps:
(1) For all of the damage functions, as R goes to infinity, an arbitrarily high proportion of the total volume under
p(x, y)  di(x, y) falls in a fixed-size region around the (unique) mode.
(2) With the damage functions ordered according to the theorem, the ratio of the integrals in the regions around the
modes can be made arbitrarily large, by increasing R.
We will start by looking at d2, d3, and d4. For all of these, as R gets large, p( x, y)  di( x, y) is unimodal. For d2,
the mode is (
b2  R
b2  1
, 0). For d3, for large R, the mode is (R  1/b, 0). For d4, as R 3 	, the difference between the
mode and (R, 0) goes to zero (i.e., the mode converges to the aim-point).
In our setup, following Lucas [10] and Umbach [19], as R 3 	, the product of the damage function and the circular




, 1, and 1, respectively, for d2, d3, and d4. Therefore, as R 3 	, the proportion of the volume under
p( x, y)  di( x, y) within n* of the mode3 1  e
.5n2, where * 
b2
b2  1
, 1, and 1, for i  2, 3, and 4, respectively.
The result follows if, at the modes (R*i, 0) and (R*j, 0), as R 3 	,
pR*i, 0  diR*i, 0
pR*j, 0  djR*j, 0
3 	.
At the modes, p(R*2, 0)  d2(R*2, 0)  (1/ 2)e
R2/ 2(1b2) and p(R*3, 0)  d3(R*3, 0)  (1/ 2)e
1/ 2b2R/b. For the
lognormal damage function, we can use the fact that, as R 3 	, p(R*4, 0)  d4(R*4, 0)/e
R 3 	. Putting these
together, we have, as R 3 	, DOR(3, 2, R) 3 	 and DOR(4, 3, R) 3 	.
It remains to be shown that, as R 3 	, DOR(2, 1, R) 3 	. We will use a similar approach to that just used. In





px, y  d1x, y dydx  2LR
2  pLR, 0.
At the mode, p(LR, 0)  (1/ 2)e(LRR)
2/ 2. The ratio
pR*2, 0  d2R*2, 0
pR*1, 0  d1R*1, 0
, at the modes, is eR
2/ 2(1b2)(LRR)2/ 2, which
goes to infinity as R does. Thus, as R 3 	, DOR(2, 1, R) 3 	.
Proof of Theorem 2
For ease of exposition, we will again assume that the firing errors are circular normal around the aim-point. The more
general case follows almost directly by replacing  with min{1, 2}, where 1 and 2 are the standard deviations in
the rotated coordinate system such that x and y are independent. Without loss of generality, we assume that both the
318 Naval Research Logistics, Vol. 50 (2003)
weapon’s aim-point and the target are at the origin. That is, this proof is for DOR(i, j, 0). This is not as restrictive as
it may appear because, if the target is offset, for all   0, there exists * such that for all   * the offset is less than
 standard deviations from the mean. That is, for large enough , the target is arbitrarily close (in terms of standard
deviations) to the mean of the impact point distribution.
We will first show that as  3 	, P 3 0.
Key facts needed for this are:
(1) For all R  0 and   0, there exists   0 such that x2y2R2 p(x, y) dydx  1  e
R2/(22) 
 .
(2) The damage functions are assumed to have finite lethal area. Thus, for all   0, there exists R  0 such that
x2y2R2 d(x, y) dydx 
 .





px, y  dx, y dydx  
x2y2R2
px, y  dx, y dydx  
x2y2R2
px, y  dx, y dydx.
In addition, the heights of d( x, y) and p( x, y) are bounded at one and 1/(22), respectively. Thus, for any given R 
0 and   0,
P  
x2y2R2
px, y dydx  221 
x2y2R2
dx, y dydx.
For any , using fact (2), R can be chosen to make the second term arbitrarily small. Given that R, and fact (1),  (the
new sigma must be greater than the initial ) can be chosen to make the first term arbitrarily small (while simultaneously
not increasing the second term). It follows that, as  3 	, P 3 0. We have now shown the first part of the theorem.
For the proof of the other part of Theorem 2, we need to show that, as 3 	, DOR(i, j, 0) 3 Ai/Aj. We will again
decompose x y p( x, y)  d( x, y) d ydx into two parts, i.e.,

x2y2R2
px, y  dx, y dydx  
x2y2R2
px, y  dx, y dydx.
With the decomposition, we need to show that, as  3 	,






px, y  dix, y dydx  
x2y2R2
px, y  dix, y dydx

x2y2R2
px, y  djx, y dydx  
x2y2R2





We will first show that we can choose an R such that the two right-hand terms can be simultaneously made arbitrarily
small relative to the two left-hand terms. If either di or dj are such that there exists an R with d(r)  0 for all r  R,
this follows trivially. Otherwise, since the lethal area ( Ai) of damage function di is finite, for all   0, there exists R
such that x2y2R2 di( x, y) d ydx 
  and x2y2R2 di( x, y) d ydx  Ai  . Now, consider the ratio

x2y2R2
px, y  di1x, y dydx

x2y2R2
px, y  di2x, y dydx
,
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where i1 and i2 can be either i or j. Since, for all points ( x, y) within R of the origin p( x, y)  (22)1e(R
2/ 22),
and for all ( x, y) a distance greater than R from the origin p( x, y) 
 (22)1e(R




px, y  di1x, y dydx

x2y2R2


















We can now choose R to simultaneously make this numerator arbitrarily small and the denominator arbitrarily close to
Ai2. Putting this together, for all   0 and   0, we can choose R* such that for all R  R*, we have

x2y2R2
px, y  dix, y dydx

x2y2R2
px, y  djx, y dydx
 PiPj  , PiPj   .
Now, suppose that R  R*, for all ( x, y) with x2  y2  R2, p( x, y)  ((22)1e(R
2/ 22), (22)1). Thus,
for any pair of points ( x1, y1) and ( x2, y2), within a distance R of the origin, as  3 	, p( x1, y1)/p( x2, y2) 3 1.
Therefore, as  3 	,

x2y2R2
px, y  dix, y dydx

x2y2R2









which, from above, can be made arbitrarily close (by the choice of R) to Ai/Aj.
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